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Of Forgery, 
Ancient and Modern 
Manfredi Piccolomini 
What is the difference between an essentially exact dupli-
cate-more commonly called forgery-made in recent years of a 
fifteenth-century Italian painting representing a Madonna with 
Child, and a replica of a twentieth-century "readymade"-say, 
for example, Marcel Duchamp's Bottle Rack-also reproduced in 
present times? There is no simple answer to this question . The 
issue of forgery lies ·in the individual perception of the beholder. 
Let us start our analysis by imagining one of the many 
nineteenth-century English or American art connoisseurs who 
went to Italy for the purpose of acquiring old-master paintings to 
be sold at a substantial profit to museums or private collectors at 
home . The connoisseur would visit country churches in Tuscany 
or Umbria in search of valuable Italian works and, upon finding, 
for example, the altarpiece of a small Romanesque church, would 
try to meet and befriend the parish priest . The priest, most likely 
a naive country priest, deferential to the art-loving and sophisti-
cated foreigner and certainly not aware of the developing interna-
tional interest in early Italian art, would probably give away the 
painting in exchange for some money presented to him as a philan-
thropic donation to the church. The connoisseur would also offer 
to replace the work of art with another one, exactly alike, made by 
a contemporary "artist." He would clearly not mention the fact 
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that the "artist" in question went under the more common name 
of forger. 
The priest would accept the offer happily, considering it 
highly advantageous to the parish. Nothing would be lost, and 
finally an improvement in the dilapidated church would be pos-
sible. As for the painting, the priest would not think of it as having 
an artistic value, only a religious one, as the object of daily worship. 
An exact reproduction would therefore make no difference. The 
congregation would not even notice it. The connoisseur, for his 
part, would perceive the matter quite differently. He would be 
able to acquire what he considers an artistic masterpiece in ex-
change for a little cash and a cheap imitation. One of those imita-
tions that have by now become famous, concocted by one of the 
many art forgers who found a vast and growing market for their 
productions beginning during the mid-nineteenth century. 
Let us now bring our nineteenth-century connoisseur to a 
major Italian city like Florence, placing him in contact with a 
member of a fading aristocracy who nevertheless still owns one 
or two portraits of his ancestors by Bronzino. Here too the connois-
seur would offer some money and an exact, newly made replace-
ment for the painting. Finding some use for the money, the owner 
would also greedily accept it. This situation is, however, radically 
different from the preceding one. In this case the seller knew well 
that the portrait was made by a leading artist and that his ancestors 
had paid a substantial sum for the commission. He knew well 
that the replacement accepted in exchange, regardless of the exac-
titude of execution, was not the original work by Bronzino. In 
accepting the deal he accepted the forgery, and was bound to pass 
on the fraud to members of his family and to his friends. 
From the two completely imagined but nevertheless represen-
tative examples of the way in which Italy lost so much of its art 
during the past century to foreign collections, one thing should be 
clear: the idea of fake depends, in the first place, on cultural and historical 
conditions. The priest, while understanding that his replacement 
painting was an imitation, did not associate with it the fraudulent 
and deceptive aspects that make up the quintessential nature of 
the fake. The awareness of having accepted a fraudulent deal in-
stead would, or should, haunt the complying aristocrat for the 
rest of his life. 
Let us now move to a more modern aspect of the fake, and 
see what happens to art forgery in modern times. 
In 1914 Marcel Duchamp took a few objects from daily life 
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such as a bicycle which he promptly fastened for no logical reason 
to a kitchen stool, or a bottle rack of the type used in French 
wineries to dry wine bottles, signed them and claimed them as 
works of art. For many good reasons the art establishment did 
not call Duchamp's bluff, and in this way, almost as if by magic, an 
ordinary bottle rack became Marcel Duchamp's Bottle Rack. Today 
it enjoys the renown and the popularity of some of the greatest 
art works of all times. With the Bottle Rack was born one of the 
great artistic movements of our century, that of the "readymade." 
In the 1960s, when Duchamp was enjoying the height of his 
celebrity as the guru of the twentieth-century avant-garde, the 
Milanese art dealer Arturo Schwarz finally called his bluff. 
Schwarz had several sets of the "readymades" forged (but is it 
possible to forge an industrial object?), asked Duchamp to sign 
them, and put each set up for sale at $25,000! Duchamp was 
amused by the game, complied with the signing, and enjoyed the 
hefty revenues, saying he had done nothing to earn them! He 
had, however, become the forger of himself. 
Let us finally suppose that I, the author of this article, travel-
ling through France during the summer long after Duchamp's 
death, find a bottle rack just like his, buy it for a few dollars, and 
then try to sell it as a work of art. Would I be selling a fake? Would 
the object be more of a fake if I said that I was selling Duchamp's 
Bottle Rack rather than just a bottle rack? What if I forged 
Duchamp's signature on it? After all, Duchamp did not "make" 
the original Bottle Rack. He bought it in a store just as I do. 
There seems to be a substantial difference between the fake 
of an old-master painting such as a Renaissance Madonna with 
Child and that of a modern work such as Duchamp's readymade. 
In the case of the readymade, Schwarz' "fake" or my "fake" are not 
anymore "fakes" than Duchamp's piece. In terms of an industrial 
object there is no real original. As in Plato's theory of the arts, the 
original never lies in the object but in the idea, and there can never 
be a perfect rendition of the idea. Duchamp's Bottle Rack is just 
as good as mine, whether it is signed or not, and my bottle rack 
is just as good as Schwarz'. What Duchamp has over Schwarz 
and me is that he had the original idea of transforming an ordinary 
bottle rack into a piece of art. But insofar as the object in itself is 
concerned, any bottle rack would do just fine. The originality is 
in the mental process that leads to the nemesis of the ordinary 
piece and transforms it into a work of art. 
I must add that this definition is only true in theory. In the 
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real world of art made up of art dealers and museum curators, 
collectors and huge tax breaks for art donations, there is obviously 
an interest in preserving the originality of any object considered 
to be a work of art, be it a Renaissance painting or an industrial 
object. The law of supply and demand teaches that prices rise in 
inverse proportion to the availability of the object. There cannot 
be too many bottle racks each worth several hundred thousands 
of dollars. The marketplace's invisible hand protects itself by 
championing hairsplitting discussions and Sherlock Holmes-like 
investigations to distinguish the "good" bottle rack from the "bad" 
one, the one worth a fortune from the one worth only a few 
dollars. But such discussions do not take into consideration that 
the only difference between the two objects lies in the reality of 
Duchamp's eye and hand! 
It is an ironic and paradoxical close to this discussion on 
Duchamp that the first, and, as it were, "original," Bottle Rack 
signed by the artist in 1914 has been lost. The only existing bottle 
racks are "replicas"! 
In the case of our old-master painting, be it a Madonna with 
Child or a Bronzino, originality rests in the artifact and not in the 
idea. Both the Madonna and Child and the portrait are ancient 
and traditional tropes painted by many artists through the cen-
turies. One artist rather than another receives a commission to 
paint a work in one of these generic areas because his style, his 
special hand is in demand. To forge the work of an old master is 
always a long and often imperfect process during which the forger 
immerses himself in the old master's times and carefully studies 
all of his stylistic details. In composition, anatomy, color and other 
features, each great master exercises his individual style, and a 
successful forger has to imitate all of these particulars to the best 
of his ability. Modern connoisseurship of old masters, starting 
with Bernard Berenson and Roberto Longhi, consists in the careful 
study of these details, and it is often said that a successful forger 
always works according to the advice of a good connoisseur . Con-
noisseurs are also those who, by pointing out some "mistake" in 
the painting, are able to uncover the forgery. 
And what about the personality of the forger? Who is he? 
How and why does he come to do what he does? Very little is 
known about forgers. They are surrounded by an almost sacred 
aura of mystery. We know for a fact that there were, and probably 
still are, many of them. We know that starting with the second half 
of the nineteenth century a substantial market developed for their 
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talents, especially in Florence and Siena, the birthplaces of Italian 
art. But it is extremely difficult to do research on them. Even art 
historians who have a special eye for detecting fakes and who 
often write and discuss the theory and history of forgery-Federico 
Zeri is the first one to come to mind-are very careful never to 
mention names. They glide over the subject by saying that the 
proper name is irrelevant to the issue of forgery or, more simply, 
that they cannot remember it. There are legal entanglements in 
naming forgers and even I, who am not an art historian, prefer 
to avoid mentioning the names of the one or two I know. One 
always fears that naming names may open a can of worms .... 
The forger's personality is therefore by-and-large only matter 
for speculation. Obviously money is the most important motiva-
tion for a forger since fame, the other great stimulator of human 
activity, is forbidden to him by the very nature of his work. The 
opportunity to compete in disguise with the greatest artists of all 
times is probably another great side benefit since the ability to 
make one's own work pass, say, for a Raphael or a Michelangelo, 
must provide some satisfaction. On the other hand, the faker is 
protected by anonymity in the case of failure. But there is surely 
another very interesting dimension to the forger's work which 
needs to be analyzed from the psychological point of view . Obvi-
ously a very talented artist in his own right, at least from the 
technical point of view, the forger freely chooses to annihilate his 
own artistic persona in order to duplicate that of others. Insecurity 
about his material well-being and low self-esteem involving the 
real worth of his talents compel him to imitate others' talents 
rather than promote his own. By doing so he is protected from 
official failure while still having the opportunity to enjoy fame 
vicariously, although in solitude, whenever his artifact succeeds in 
passing as the artifact of someone else. Like Woody Allen's Zelig, 
the art forger is the quintessential chameleon, the one who prefers 
to excel through others rather than to make his own personal indi-
vidualized statement. If one were to accept classical paradigm of 
art as mimesis, then it would be easy to define the forgery as the 
imitation, albeit the fraudulent imitation, of the imitation. 
In more recent times, as things seem to have become much 
more complicated, the definition of forgery is a good deal more 
elusive. During the twentieth century, both artists like Duchamp 
and critics have shown a great interest in the theory and the 
practice of forgery, probably because through an understanding 
of the phenomenon one can reach interesting conclusions about 
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some of the artistic developments of our times . In a well-known 
and much quoted article written in the mid-1930s, "The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin 
tries to come to terms with the fact that because of the development 
of new artistic media, such as photography and cinema, as well 
as improvements in lithography, a work of art can be reproduced 
almost infinitely. Seemingly unable to explain what has happened 
to the original under these new conditions and incapable of retriev-
ing from the sea of unlimited reproducibility the baffling real thing, 
Benjamin states that in our time "the distinction between author 
and public is about to lose its basic character." 1 Confronting the 
same subject more directly from the point of authorship in a well-
known short story, "Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote," Jorge 
Luis Borges imagines a twentieth-century author who set out to re-
write Cervantes. In describing Menard's intentions, Borges writes: 
He did not want to compose another Quixote-which is easy-but 
the Quixote itself. Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechan-
ical transcription of the original: he did not propose to copy it. His 
admirable intent ion was to produce a few pages which would coin-
cide-word for word and line for line-with those of Miguel de 
Cervantes . 2 
As the story progresses, Menard succeeds in his initial goal, 
producing without copying a few chapters which coincide word 
for word with the text of Cervantes. "Cervantes' text and Menard's 
are verbally identical," says Borges, "but the second is almost 
infinitely richer. "3 
What is this added richness of the copy-which-is-not-a-copy? 
Obviously, the production of a Golden Age style and of Golden 
Age narrative structures in our time has quite a different meaning 
in terms of irony and parody than if the same work had been 
composed in its original century. The added richness of the con-
temporary version lies in the fact that while preserving all the 
characteristics of the Renaissance one, it also adds elements such as 
parody which are the result of literary and historical anachronism . 
The main focus of Borges' s story is not to point out the differences 
between two supposedly identical works of literature composed 
in different centuries, but, again, to take up his own personal war 
against the battered concepts of authorship and originality. Because 
Menard did not copy Cervantes' work, his Quixote is as much an 
original as Cervantes' Quixote, the one everyone generally accepts 
as the only possible original. 
The crucial innovations which have occurred in all the arts 
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during the twentieth century have all carried with them attacks on 
notions of authorship and originality. In his first Futurist Manifesto 
of 1909, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti maintained that "a roaring 
automobile, which seems to run on shrapnel, is more beautiful 
than the Nike of Samothrace. "4 Thus, anticipating Duchamp, and 
Andy Warhol's Pop Art, he proposed an artistic role for industrial 
products or "readymades." While Marinetti permitted the follow-
ers of his movement to deposit a bunch of flowers before 
Leonardo's Gioconda only once every year, he claimed that "to 
admire an old master painting is equivalent to pouring our sensi-
bility into a funerary urn rather than projecting it far away, through 
violent creative sparkles of invention and action. "5 Innovation 
was to take the place of tradition. Marinetti wrote that "the great 
Parisian tailors who by the fast invention of new fashions create 
a passion for the new and hatred for what has already been seen" 
were among those "possessed by divine forces. "6 
Most important though, Marinetti proposed the abolition of 
the artist's "I," of his individuality, in the work of art. He con-
tended that the role of the artist was to bring reality into the work of 
art rather than infusing it with his own subjective point of view. 7 
Tristan Tzara picked up on this point in 1922 while theorizing the 
artistic principles of the Dada movement: 
Art has not the celestial and universal value that people like to 
attribute to it. Life is far more interesting. Dada knows the correct 
measure that should be given to art: with subtle, perfidious 
methods, Dada introduces it into daily life. And vice versa. 8 
It is interesting to note that exactly one year earlier (1921), in 
one of the greatest plays of the century, Six Characters in Search of 
an Author, Luigi Pirandello represented his characters as they rebel 
against their author-director because he tries to make them act 
and do things according to his personal artistic vision. The six 
characters claim to know their drama better than the director and 
they want the freedom to act it out as they know it. 
Reality triumphs over art. The original is no longer in the 
artist-whether we speak of plot, painting or musical score-but 
it belongs to the world itself. 
This paradox was brought to its furthest limit by a contemporary 
musician who in 1952 composed a "silent piece." In a performance 
of John Cage's 4'33" (the title indicates the length of the piece), the 
audience is exposed to a performer who walks on stage and sits in 
front of his piano without playing. For four minutes and thirty-three 
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seconds the audience witnesses a totally silent musical composition! 
But as complete silence is obviously an impossibility, the audience 
in fact hears noises that inevitably occur in any circumstance. More 
particularly, if the performance takes place outdoors there will be 
foreign noises and sounds intruding, such as birds singing or the 
wind blowing through the branches of trees. These foreign and 
unexpected noises were Cage's goals in 4'33". Rather than imposing 
his own musical sounds, his own individual musical preferences on 
the audience, Cage wanted the audience to become aware of sounds 
that are created naturally and by chance in the environment. Com-
menting on this work, the composer said: 
I wanted my work to be free of my own likes and dislikes, because 
I think music should be free of the feelings and ideas of the composer. 
I have felt and hoped to have led other people to feel that the sounds 
of their environment constitute a music which is more interesting 
than the music which they would hear if they went into a concert hall. 9 
Thus in Cage's radical musical statement, the originality of the work 
is transferred from the work itself and the personality of its composer 
to the surrounding world and to chance. The best condition for the 
artist in our time, Cage seems to say, is to disappear as an artist! 
Pop artists have been especially attentive to the theme of forgery 
in the past thirty or so years. By "forging" boxes of Brillo Soap Pads, 
Andy Warhol set the art world afire in the 1960s. And painting 
symbols such as the American flag, dart targets and numbers, Jasper 
Johns based his art on the reproduction of things which are nothing 
in themselves. What is the difference between painting a symbol, 
imitating it, or simply forging it? In his recent Four Seasons series 
exhibited at the 1988 Venice Biennale, Johns carries his symbolist 
theory to the point of infusing the work with an image that refers 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of the multiple and undefinable 
meanings of images. The image of the head of a duck which can 
also be seen as the head of a rabbit, a problem that takes up many 
pages in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 10 makes its 
emblematic appearance in the Spring painting of the Four Seasons 
opposite a trick vase, the sides of which form profiles of Queen 
Elizabeth and Prince Philip. Everything becomes something else; 
everything is a decoy. And once a decoy is painted and reduced to 
a flat surface, how does it differ from the "real thing" it fraudulently 
claims to represent? 
Probably the most compelling artistic exercise in forgery of 
our times is that of J. S. G. Boggs, a fairly unknown artist until two 
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years ago when his arrest and trial on charges of counterfeiting 
currency bills made him a celebrity almost overnight. By forging 
money Boggs strikes at the heart of one of the most inviolable 
and sacred symbols of our times. This is his scheme: Boggs draws 
a perfect reproduction-his forgeries are said to be unrecognizable 
from a slight distance-of a Treasury note, say a $100 bill, on only 
one side of an accurately dimensioned piece of paper. He reserves 
the reverse side for his signature and other relevant information. 
Then Boggs tries to buy something with the note. He tells the 
seller that the bill is his own drawing, but that to accept the paper 
is to accept the value arbitrarily assigned to it. The forged bill 
must be accepted for $100 and if the products Boggs buys are 
worth $95, he must receive $5 in change. Boggs also demands a 
written receipt for his purchase. Following this transaction, Boggs 
sells the real $5 bill obtained in change and the receipt to one of 
his collectors for several hundred dollars. He also gives the collec-
tor some clues as to who owns the forged $100 bill. It is up to the 
collector to contact the merchant and to acquire the forged bill, 
which at this point usually sells for a lot more than the value 
drawn on its face. This act completes the artistic process: a work 
of art is made of the forged bill, the receipt and the real bill 
obtained in change. These three items are then hung in galleries 
and sold for several thousand dollars. 
Some of these counterfeited bills hanging in a London gallery 
were confiscated by Scotland Yard in 1986 and led to Boggs' trial for 
counterfeiting without the prior consent of the Bank of England. 
Although Boggs risked a severe sentence, he was found not guilty 
by the jury. Some of the jurors admired the work and became 
fascinated by the idea behind it. In an interview, his lawyer said: 
A banknote represents value, and a Boggs does not, though it has 
value. Boggs does nothing to resolve the category confusion, be-
cause it is the very process of his art to mystify, to obscure the 
distinction. But surely it is the function of the law to recognize and 
proclaim such obvious category distinctions. 11 
It is again interesting to emphasize that Boggs' troubles were 
caused by concerns arising from the marketplace and from the 
authorities" implicit responsibility to curb any scheme, however 
innocuous, that could threaten accepted social values regarding 
material entities. A fake is a fake especially if it constitutes a 
hazard, real or imagined, to the established value system. 
In a similar literary experiment, several years ago the English 
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novelist Doris Lessing seemed to confirm that originality and au-
thorship are a primary marketplace need. Lessing wrote a novel, 
The Diary of a Good Neighbour, under an assumed name and asked 
her agent to submit it to publishers as the work of a beginning 
writer. Lessing' s two long-standing British publishers turned 
down the work of the supposedly unknown beginner, demon-
strating the revenue valve of the author over the work. 12 
We have come a long way from our nineteenth-century forger 
of old-master paintings who works in hiding and fears any pub-
licity, to Boggs who, aside from being proud of his forgeries, 
assumes that they will be sold at a price much higher than their 
original value as monetary units. What happened in between? Is 
modern art different from classical art? Has art changed? 
It is very difficult to give one definite answer to this question 
because diverse theories of the arts abound, and especially because 
art, at its best, always eludes and transcends theory. The difficulty 
is even greater with modern art because it has made ambiguity, 
as Boggs' attorney properly pointed out, one of its frimary con-
cerns. However, if indeed as Arthur Danto claims, 1 modern art 
tends to blur the distinction between art and life by centering on 
the ordinary rather than the exceptional, then we must conclude 
that the issue of originality is no longer relevant to an understand-
ing of art as it might be in the case of an old-master painting. The 
visual and tactile aspects impressed on the work by the artist's 
individuality are no longer in question. Modern art is conceptual 
rather than ocular, it speaks to the mind rather than to the eye, 
it is to be thought and not seen; it is, in one word, philo-
sophical rather than perceptual. 14 The "hand" of the artist, his 
"patte" (paw), as the French avant-garde artists of the beginning 
of the century sarcastically called it, has practically disappeared. 
It is not the image in itself and its "beauty" that count, but the 
intellectual process that the image sets in motion. The lack of 
originality characteristic of the readymades which shamelessly 
flaunt a total absence of the "hand" is mentally much more stimu-
lating because it challenges the boundaries of art with impending 
non-art, thus questioning the very nature and legitimacy of art! 
Finally the "real world," art's worst enemy! The "real world," 
the world of money and banks, the marketplace of art and of all 
other things as well, does not seem to accept the total reproducibil-
ity of art or, for that purpose, of anything else. Not yet, at least. 
If everything were totally reproducible-from works of art to $100 
bills--the world would probably be total chaos. The marketplace 
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tells the common man, if not Duchamp, that it is not enough to 
imprint one's signature on an ordinary object to make it worth a 
fortune. It tells us that we have to toil for our well-being, it reminds 
us of our human condition. With the message it encodes in its 
abolition of originality, modern art paradoxically does what all 
great art has always done: It expands our horizons, it replaces 
our daily concerns with spiritual inspiration. Maybe it describes 
for us the Garden of Eden, that place of total availability which 
rests well hidden in the subconscious. 
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